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In May 1981 Leonid Brezhnev and KGB chairman Yuri Andropov told senior KGB officers that the United States was preparing a secret nuclear first strike, and Andropov launched Operation RYAN, the largest peacetime intelligence operation in Soviet history. American psyops sent fleets and bombers straight at Soviet territory, Pershing II missiles in West Germany promised a strike in four to six minutes, a Soviet interceptor shot down Korean Air Lines Flight 007 on September 1, 1983, killing all 269 aboard, and on September 26 Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Petrov judged a satellite report of five incoming missiles to be a glitch. Into that climate NATO launched Able Archer 83 on November 7, a command post exercise rehearsing the move from conventional war to DEFCON 1.

The drill used a new coded communications format, theater-wide radio silence, an airlift of 19,000 U.S. soldiers and the participation of Margaret Thatcher and Helmut Kohl. KGB agents, ordered to report raw indicators without analysis, sent Moscow observations that matched their first strike checklist. Soviet air units in East Germany and Poland went on high alert and nuclear warheads were loaded onto combat aircraft. Lieutenant General Leonard Perroots of U.S. Air Forces in Europe advised against raising NATO’s alert, the exercise ended on November 11, and the Soviets stood down. Only later did double agent Oleg Gordievsky reveal the panic, a revelation that helped turn the U.S. president toward the summits at Geneva and Reykjavik and the 1987 INF Treaty.

• RYAN agents were told to track late-night hours at defense ministries and sudden surges in demand at national blood banks.
• A newly appointed national security advisor pulled the U.S. president, vice president and defense secretary out of the exercise.
• Soviet fighter bombers were placed on 30-minute alert while the drill ran.
• A 1990 President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board report, made public in 2015, found U.S. intelligence had missed the depth of Soviet fear.
• A document declassified in 2021 confirmed that warheads were loaded onto Soviet combat aircraft.